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False Security: How Courts Have Improperly Rendered the Protections of the Protective 
Order Illusory 
Ramona L. Lampley[1] 
 
The protective order is perhaps one of the most useful and “taken for granted” discovery devices 
contemplated by the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In civil litigation, in which 
confidential, proprietary, and trademark information is routinely demanded through written 
discovery requests, the parties often ward off heated discovery disputes through the entry of a 
joint protective order.[2]  The purpose of this type of protective order is to permit the parties to 
produce business information—for example, information concerning the design and testing of a 
particular product—without fear that the information will be disseminated publicly, and with a 
court order that the information be used only for purposes of  the present litigation.  The United 
States Federal District Court for the District of Colorado discussed the usefulness of such 
“blanket” protective orders in Gillard v. Boulder Valley School District Re.-2,[3] 
 
Blanket protective orders serve the interests of a just, speedy, and less expensive determination 
of complex disputes by alleviating the need for and delay occasioned by extensive and repeated 
judicial intervention. In view of increasingly complex cases and the existing workload of the trial 
courts, “[b]lanket protective orders are essential to the functioning of civil discovery. [A]bsent 
[such orders], discovery would come to a virtual standstill....”[4] 
 
Other courts have recognized that these “blanket” protective orders, designed to permit discovery 
into confidential information without fear by the producing party of its public dissemination, 
have become the “standard practice” in “complex cases,” because they enable the discovery 
process to “operate more efficiently.”[5] 
 
Although these “blanket” protective orders are often entered into by the parties’ agreement and 
are orders of the court, enforceable by sanctions or contempt, many practitioners and clients may 
place undue reliance on the protective order’s seemingly firm restrictions on disclosure.  In some 
jurisdictions, such as the Tenth Circuit, the standard for modification of a protective order, even 
by an intervening non-party after the end of the litigation, is more lenient than many clients 
realize at the time the protected documents are produced. 
 
The seminal case in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is United Nuclear Corporation v. 
Cranford Insurance Company.[6]  In United Nuclear, the defendant insurance companies entered 
into a protective order with the plaintiff, who sought a declaration of liability under the 
environmental impairment insurance policy issued by the defendants.[7]  The protective order 
declared all discovery materials to be confidential and prohibited their use or disclosure other 
than for preparation for or use at trial.  The parties in the underlying litigation produced 
documents in reliance on this protective order.[8]  Pursuant to the settlement agreement, 
documents produced by the defendants were to be retained at United Nuclear’s expense for ten 
years.  
 
Three years after the case settled and the district court dismissed the suit with prejudice, litigants 
in other lawsuits around the country seeking determination that they had coverage pursuant to 
Cranford and International’s insurance policies moved to intervene in United Nuclear for the 
purpose of modifying the protective order.  In essence, these non-party litigants sought to modify 
a protective order in a case in which they were not involved, after the case had been dismissed, in 
order to obtain from United Nuclear documents produced by Cranford and International in 
reliance on the protective order.  According to the intervening litigants, they sought access to the 
discovery in United Nuclear to avoid duplicating that discovery in their respective cases.[9]  The 
defendants opposed the modification of the protective order.  The court’s stated reason for the 
defendant’s opposition to the modification was “to make it more burdensome for [the] 
Intervenors to pursue their collateral litigation.”[10]  The case did not discuss what methods, if 
any, the Intervenors had made to obtain this discovery of this information from the defendants 
Cranford and International through traditional means of discovery. 
 
The Tenth Circuit first recognized the importance of such blanket protective orders to the 
efficiency of civil discovery and complex litigation.  The court also recognized that a number of 
federal courts have adopted a “presumption in favor of the continued integrity of the protective 
order,” permitting modification only under extraordinary circumstances.[11]  However, the 
Tenth Circuit declined to adopt this presumption, and instead held: 
 
[W]here an appropriate modification of a protective order can place private litigants in a position 
they would otherwise reach only after repetition of another’s discovery, such modification can be 
denied only where it would tangibly prejudice substantial rights of the party opposing 
modification. Once such prejudice is demonstrated, however, the district court has broad 
discretion in judging whether that injury outweighs the benefits of any possible modification of 
the protective order.[12] 
 
This framework has been referenced by collateral litigants in later cases seeking to obtain 
discovery they could not otherwise obtain through a third-party who became privy to the 
information via a protective order.[13]  And some litigants have misconstrued the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding in United Nuclear and the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Wilk as creating a presumption in 
favor of modifying a protective order to avoid repetitious discovery, unless the party resisting 
production (the party who presumably relied on the protective order) can show it would 
“tangibly prejudice” its “substantial rights.”  Although the United Nuclear court’s holding did 
contain strong language suggesting that a protective order should be modified, it was based on 
the facts of that case, in which the defendant’s only basis for contesting the modification was the 
“desire to make it more burdensome for Intervenors to pursue their collateral litigation.”[14] 
 
Litigants and courts who construe the language set forth above in United Nuclear as creating a 
presumption in favor of modification of a protective order for any collateral litigants do an 
injustice to the remaining language of the case, and to the importance of the protective order as a 
necessary discovery measure in complex litigation.  First, the United Nuclear court also 
recognized that once the opponent to modification has demonstrated that modification would 
prejudice its substantial rights, “the district court has broad discretion in judging whether that 
injury outweighs the benefits of any possible modification of the protective order.”[15]  In cases 
in which parties produce discovery to an opposing party in reliance on a protective order, it is 
difficult to envision how modification would not prejudice the producing parties’ substantial 
rights.  The producing party has an expectation of confidentiality, and based on this expectation, 
produces to the other party confidential, perhaps, proprietary business information relevant to 
that underlying lawsuit only.  For an adversarial party in unrelated litigation to attempt to obtain 
that discovery, produced pursuant to a protective order, via the collateral adversary instead of 
through normal discovery procedures, is to effectively lift any gate-keeping function of the court 
in the collateral litigation in confining discovery to the scope of Rule 26.  If litigants were aware 
that discovery produced, pursuant to a protective order, to an opposing party could then be 
subject to a subpoena by an adversary in another case, and possible production by that initial 
adversary, document production would screech to a halt in many complex cases. 
 
Perhaps the United Nuclear court recognized this possibility when it acknowledged that, “a 
collateral litigant has no right to obtain discovery materials that are privileged or otherwise 
immune from eventual involuntary discovery in collateral litigation.”[16]  The problem, of 
course, arises in enforcing these restrictions under the framework of a subpoena to a third-party, 
who was at one time, adversarial to the party opposing production. 
 
Therefore, to the extent the United Nuclear court failed to recognized, in 1990, the extreme 
consequences of diluting the protections offered by a protective order in a civil case by 
subjecting it to post-litigation modification, that decision should be modified.  Other courts have 
already begun to retract from case law that suggested protective orders could be easily modified 
after the litigation had ceased.  For example, the United Nuclear court relied heavily on Wilk v. 
American Medical Association[17] in adopting Wilk’s holding that modification of a protective 
order designed to prevent repetitious discovery should only be denied where it would tangibly 
prejudice the opposing parties’ substantial rights.[18]  This portion of Wilk, directly relied on by 
United Nuclear, was based on the presumption that, “as a general proposition, pre-trial discovery 
must take place in the [sic] public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access 
to the proceedings.”[19]  According to the Wilk court, “[t]his presumption should operate with 
all the more force when litigants seek to use discovery in aid of collateral litigation on similar 
issues.”[20] 
 
However, the Seventh Circuit has recently eroded Wilk’s premise that pre-trial discovery should 
take place in the public absent compelling reasons. In Bond v. Utreras,[21] the Seventh Circuit 
stated that 
 
[t]o the extent . . . that these cases [referencing Wilk] are premised upon a principle that “pre-
trial discovery must take place in ... public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public 
access to the proceedings,” they have been superseded by the 2000 amendment to Rule 5 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[22] 
 
Thus, the Bond court appropriately recognized that, “Pre-trial discovery [tools]... ‘are not public 
components of a civil trial,’ ‘were not open to the public at common law,’ and ‘in general, are 
conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.’”[23]  Because there is no public right of 
access to information exchanged between private litigants in pre-trial discovery, the entire 
premise of Wilk and its progeny (including United Nuclear) is called into question. 
 
Thus, if this issue is re-addressed in the Tenth Circuit, the court will presumably examine the 
authority in other jurisdictions, including the Seventh Circuit, retracting from a standard that 
allows modification of protective orders without a showing of exigent circumstances.[24]  
Further, if Colorado courts address a similar situation, in the present age of mass discovery 
production, one would hope that Colorado courts would adopt the Second Circuit’s standard of 
requiring extraordinary circumstances.  Although no court has set forth a list of factors that may 
present exigent circumstances, one would think that the intervening party seeking to modify the 
protective order in order to obtain documents produced in collateral litigation would be required 
to show that it cannot obtain that discovery by other means.  In short, a party should not be 
permitted to circumvent the normal discovery procedures in litigation by obtaining modification 
of a protective order that was previously relied upon by an adversary in a different case.[25] 
 
For present day purposes however, it would behoove practitioners and their clients to be wary of 
relying too much on the perceived protections of a blanket protective order.  One knows not who 
may seek to modify that protective order and obtain discovery from one’s adversary in litigation, 
in the future.  Until Wilk and its progeny are modified, that possibility looms on the horizon. 
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